Error Preservation in Texas Civil Cases, 9/14/19

September 14, 2019

Dear Folks:

The volume of decisions has followed its annual abatement trend since the end of the fiscal year on August 31. Both the justices and the staff attorneys had their respective annual meetings the first full week of September, and the Advanced Civil Appellate Seminar took place that same week. But the justices and staff attorneys have gotten back into the saddle, and we should expect the pace of decisions to pick up.

Table of Contents for This Blogpost

Exercise extreme caution when drafting or signing an agreed judgment, in terms of differentiating whether all parties agree only as to form, or also as to substance

You must present your complaint in a timely fashion

Notice

The Blurbs

Exercise extreme caution when drafting or signing an agreed judgment, in terms of differentiating whether all parties agree only as to form, or also as to substance:

Judgment: “A judgment entered upon the agreement of the parties cures all non-jurisdictional defects. One 2000 Int’l Truck Tractor v. State, No. 01-11-00072-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 9247, 2012 WL 5458421, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Mailhot v. Mailhot, 124 S.W.3d 775, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)). A party may revoke its consent to a settlement agreement at any time before an agreed judgment is rendered on the agreement. S & A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995); see also In the Matter of Marriage of Long, 946 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no pet.). But a party may not challenge such a judgment or defects in the proceedings in the case absent an allegation of fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation. See Authorlee v. Tuboscope Vetco Int’l, Inc., 274 S.W.3d 111, 119 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); see also Mailhot, 124 S.W.3d at 777 (holding party who asks trial court to accept settlement agreement and enter judgment accordingly may not later attack that judgment). To preserve error for appeal, a party who signs a judgment must specify that his agreement with the judgment is as to form, but not as to substance and outcome. See First Nat’l Bank v. Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d 632, 633 (Tex. 1989); see also Mailhot, 124 S.W.3d at 777. Here, as noted above, on behalf of appellant, Matherne signed the Agreed Final Judgment under the words, “AGREED AND ENTRY REQUESTED” and there was no language limiting his consent as to form, but not as to substance. Thus, appellant did not preserve error to complain about the Agreed Final Judgment, and she has waived the right to complain about it after asking the trial court to accept the agreement. See Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d at 633; see also Casu v. Marathon Ref. Co., 896 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).” Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. 01-17-00593-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8130, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sep. 5, 2019)

Judgment: “The judgment is titled “Agreed Final Judgment,” and Reedom signed the judgment as “Agreed to,” not just “agreed as to form.” This language is not necessarily sufficient to establish that the judgment is agreed, however, and appellate courts are not unanimous on the issue of whether a judgment can be challenged on appeal when it appears to be agreed but, like the Agreed Final Judgment, “has no recitation of the agreement in the body of the order itself.” Estate of Nielsen, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7915, 2018 WL 4625531, at *4. However, here the Agreed Final Judgment further recited that “[t]he parties announced an agreement” and that the court was rendering judgment after hearing that agreement. Thus, the judgment reflects that an agreement existed and also that the county court had evidence of both its existence and its substance. Contra Bexar Cty. Crim. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Mayo, 773 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ) (stating that the word “Approved,” in the judgment signed by the appellant, with nothing more, did not indicate a consent judgment when “[n]othing in the body of the judgment suggests that the case had been settled or that judgment was rendered by consent” and that “[t]here are no other indications of agreement in the record”).

Nothing in the record indicates that Reedom signed [*4] the Agreed Final Judgment under protest or in any way indicated to the county court that it did not reflect the parties’ agreement. Contra Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 767 (holding that despite signing the divorce decree as “approved and consented to as to both form and substance,” the appellant, “by his objections to the trial court’s characterization of the [profit-sharing-retirement-trust] plan, did not explicitly and unmistakably give his consent to that portion of the divorce decree and did not waive his right of appeal”). He does not argue that the judgment erroneously states the existence of an agreement when none existed or that he did not agree to the terms of the judgment. In fact, he makes no argument at all about whether the Agreed Final Judgment was an agreed judgment. Nor does he argue that the county court did not have jurisdiction to render the Agreed Final Judgment. See Pillitteri, 165 S.W.3d at 718. Instead, he appears to complain about the dismissal of a federal lawsuit he filed against Woodstock and whether the dismissal was proper under federal rules of civil procedure. Accordingly, he has waived his issues on appeal.” Reedom v. 5950 Boca Raton LP, No. 02-18-00269-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7664, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 26, 2019)

You must present your complaint in a timely fashion:

Notice: “Etienne argues in the alternative that the trial court abused its discretion in granting State Farm’s motion because the insurance policy required State Farm to give her ten days’ written notice before moving for appointment of an umpire, and she contends that State Farm failed to do so. But, Etienne neither responded to State Farm’s motion for appointment of an umpire nor appeared at the hearing on the motion. Having failed [*7] to timely raise this complaint, it is waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Moreover, and as State Farm points out, the trial court’s local rules provide that “[f]ailure to file a response may be considered a representation of no opposition.” Harris Cty. (Tex.) Co. Ct. At Law Loc. R. 3.3.3. Given Etienne’s failure to respond to State Farm’s motion or to appear at the hearing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion.” Etienne v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 14-18-00665-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8195, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sep. 10, 2019)

A few cases dealt with situations in which the parties failed to raise their complaint in the trial court.

I hope this helps.  Have a great rest of the weekend.

Yours, Steve Hayes

shayes@stevehayeslaw.com; www.stevehayeslaw.com; 817/371-8759

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Error Preservation in Texas Civil Cases, 9/2/19

September 2, 2019

Dear All:

Well, here we are at Labor Day–we may have the most brutal days of summer behind us, we can look forward to autumn, and the courts of appeals closed out the last week of their fiscal years (on August 31).  As usual, they issued a lot of opinions, and a lot of opinions which involved error preservation. Overwhelmingly, the error preservation decisions involved complaints which parties failed to raise at all in the trial court. Because of the volume of error preservation decisions, and the fact that most don’t add much to the jurisprudence, I’ve included only a few such decisions below–ones which I thought might help you, or give you a template to follow.

Table of Contents

One court explained why an appellant had expressly presented an issue in response to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment

A complaint about the failure to continue a summary judgment cannot be preserved by oral motion–it requires a written motion supported by an affidavit

Understand the dangers of signing a judgment as “agreed to,” instead of “agreed to as to form, only:”

You must make your complaint in a timely manner–and comply with the pertinent rules

Findings and Conclusions
Limitations

The Blurbs

One court explained why an appellant had expressly presented an issue in response to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment:

Summary Judgment: “The City claimed in a letter notifying WIL of a violation of the reinstatement agreement for advertising for rental a “lakefront cabin with water trampoline” and “luxury lakefront mansion.” As we have discussed, the “luxury lakefront mansion” advertisement is in the record and constitutes a violation of the agreement as to lot 43. However, the alleged “lakefront cabin with water trampoline” advertisement is not in the record. Consequently, WIL claims that the City breached the agreement and improperly evicted it on lot 46. The City argues that WIL waived consideration of this issue because this argument was raised for [*16] the first time on appeal. We disagree. Issues a nonmovant contends avoid the movant’s entitlement to summary judgment must be expressly presented by written answer to the motion or by other written response to the motion and are not expressly presented by mere reference to summary judgment evidence. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). In a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, after the movant specifies the elements for which there is no evidence, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on the elements specified in the motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 582. The nonmovant is “not required to marshal its proof; its response need only point out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i), cmt. WIL satisfied this burden. WIL’s response to the City’s motion included the issue that it complied with the reinstatement agreement, that it performed its obligations under the agreement, and that termination of the leases and eviction was improper. It specifically identified and attached evidence to its response to the motion, including James Wasson’s deposition testimony. In it, he stated that he never rented either the large house or the cabin after the parties executed the reinstatement agreement. Furthermore, at times during Wasson’s testimony, counsel referred to advertisements generally, but he was presented only with the advertisement for the large home and specifically questioned about that advertisement. As we have stated, there is no advertisement in the record for the cabin on lot 46. Accordingly, this ground was before the trial court, WIL presented more than a scintilla of evidence that it complied with the reinstatement agreement as to the cabin, and the City failed to conclusively negate it. WIL raised a fact issue as to whether the City’s termination of the lease for lot 46 and eviction was improper.” Wasson Interests v. City of Jacksonville, No. 12-13-00262-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8022, at *15-17 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 30, 2019)

A complaint about the failure to continue a summary judgment cannot be preserved by oral motion–it requires a written motion supported by an affidavit:

Continuance (Summary Judgment): “At the end of the hearing on Appellees’ motion for summary judgment Royale informed the trial court, “I would make a motion . . . [under] Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215(1)(b)3(d) [sic] to compel discovery.” . . . . When a party contends that he has not had an adequate time for discovery before a summary judgment hearing, he must file either an affidavit explaining the need for further discovery or a verified motion for continuance. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g), 251, 252; . . . . Royale did not file a verified motion for continuance or an affidavit explaining the need for further discovery. Accordingly, he has waived any argument that the trial court allowed an inadequate time for discovery or that Appellees’ motion for summary judgment was premature.” Royale v. Knightvest Mgmt., No. 05-18-00908-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8042, at *31-32 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2019)

Understand the dangers of signing a judgment as “agreed to,” instead of “agreed to as to form, only:”

Judgment: “The judgment is titled “Agreed Final Judgment,” and Reedom signed the judgment as “Agreed to,” not just “agreed as to form.” This language is not necessarily sufficient to establish that the judgment is agreed, however, and appellate courts are not unanimous on the issue of whether a judgment can be challenged on appeal when it appears to be agreed but, like the Agreed Final Judgment, “has no recitation of the agreement in the body of the order itself.” Estate of Nielsen, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7915, 2018 WL 4625531, at *4. However, here the Agreed Final Judgment further recited that “[t]he parties announced an agreement” and that the court was rendering judgment after hearing that agreement. Thus, the judgment reflects that an agreement existed and also that the county court had evidence of both its existence and its substance. Contra Bexar Cty. Crim. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Mayo, 773 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ) (stating that the word “Approved,” in the judgment signed by the appellant, with nothing more, did not indicate a consent judgment when “[n]othing in the body of the judgment suggests that the case had been settled or that judgment was rendered by consent” and that “[t]here are no other indications of agreement in the record”).

Nothing in the record indicates that Reedom signed the Agreed Final Judgment under protest or in any way indicated to the county court that it did not reflect the parties’ agreement. Contra Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 767 (holding that despite signing the divorce decree as “approved and consented to as to both form and substance,” the appellant, “by his objections to the trial court’s characterization of the [profit-sharing-retirement-trust] plan, did not explicitly and unmistakably give his consent to that portion of the divorce decree and did not waive his right of appeal”). He does not argue that the judgment erroneously states the existence of an agreement when none existed or that he did not agree to the terms of the judgment. In fact, he makes no argument at all about whether the Agreed Final Judgment was an agreed judgment. Nor does he argue that the county court did not have jurisdiction to render the Agreed Final Judgment. See Pillitteri, 165 S.W.3d at 718. Instead, he appears to complain about the dismissal of a federal lawsuit he filed against Woodstock and whether the dismissal was proper under federal rules of civil procedure. Accordingly, he has waived his issues on appeal.” Reedom v. 5950 Boca Raton LP, No. 02-18-00269-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7664, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 26, 2019)

You must make your complaint in a timely manner–and comply with the pertinent rules:

Findings and Conclusions: “Father filed his request for findings and conclusions under rule of civil procedure 296. Rule of civil procedure 296 provides that in “any case tried in the district or county court without a jury, any party may request the court to state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. Once properly requested, a trial court has twenty days to file its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and if the trial court fails to do so, the requesting party must notify the trial court within thirty days after filing the original request. Tex. R. Civ. P. 297. When a party notifies the trial court of its failure to file findings and conclusions, but the notice is untimely, the requesting party has waived the right to complain on appeal. See Vee Bar, Ltd. v. BP Amoco Corp., 361 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (holding ranch owners waived any right to complain on appeal about trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law where owners’ filing of past-due-findings notice in trial court was untimely). Here, the trial court signed its final modification order on December 20, 2018. On January 9, 2019, Father timely filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Then, on February 12, 2019, Father notified the trial court of past-due findings of fact and conclusions of law. Father’s notice of past-due findings and conclusions was not timely because it was more than thirty days after the January 9, 2019 request. Therefore, even if Father could claim an entitlement to findings under rule 296, he waived that entitlement.”  In the Interest of T.M., No. 02-19-00114-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7679, at *15-16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 26, 2019)

Limitations: “On appeal, Silverman admits that the trial court’s findings and conclusions and judgment did not specify the years from which the trial court derived each portion of the recovery amount, but she asserts that we must “assume[] that the portion of the 2013 debt included within was limitations-barred.” We disagree. It was Silverman’s burden to show that a portion of the Association’s requested recovery was time-barred and ensure the appropriate findings were entered. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 299; Payne, 381 S.W.3d at 618-19. By failing to do so she has waived any error by the trial court’s failure to find on her affirmative defense or by the trial court’s damage award.” Silverman v. Clairemont H.A., Inc., No. 02-18-00380-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7820, at *13-14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 28, 2019)

That’s all for right now.  Enjoy the rest of the holiday, and I hope to see you at the Advanced Civil Appellate Seminar later this week.

Yours,

Steve Hayes

shayes@stevehayeslaw.com; www.stevehayeslaw.com; 817/371-8759

Error Preservation in Texas Civil Cases, August 24, 2019

August 24, 2019

Dear All:

As we come to the end of the fiscal year for the courts of appeals, here are some of the error preservation decisions from last week.

Table of Contents

You don’t have to cite the specific case in your summary judgment response in order to rely on that case on appeal—merely arguing its premise is sufficiently specific

A party can first raise the issue of governmental immunity on appeal

You have to obtain a ruling—including on discovery issues

You have to comply with the pertinent rules, such as on Default Judgments.

Here are the opinion compilations on the foregoing issues

You don’t have to cite the specific case in your summary judgment response in order to rely on that case on appeal—merely arguing its premise is sufficiently specific:

Summary Judgment:  “Kroger argues that Mendoza waived any argument under Corbin by not relying on it in the trial court. We cannot agree. We see no legal basis for Kroger’s argument that application [*14]  of Corbin in a premises-defect case can be waived by failure to cite to the case. It has never been the law that a particular case must be cited to argue the application of its underlying principle. Cf., e.g., Tex. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Morrison, 381 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Tex. 2012) (“Casteel error may be preserved without specifically mentioning Casteel.”). Mendoza was not required to cite to Corbin to rely on its legal principles. Even if she were required to have done so, Mendoza specifically argued in response to Kroger’s summary-judgment motion that “the water refill station placed in a high foot traffic area posed an unreasonable risk of harm in itself . . . .” This argument that the self-serve water dispenser presented an unreasonably dangerous condition aligns with the Corbin analysis and invites analysis of Kroger’s knowledge focused on the water dispenser versus the fallen water.”  Hernandez v. Kroger, No. 01-18-00562-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7555, at *13-14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 22, 2019)

A party can first raise the issue of governmental immunity on appeal.

Governmental Immunity:  “TxDOT correctly asserts that we must address this argument. HN5 Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not divest appellate courts of authority to review immunity claims first asserted on interlocutory appeal. Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012). In this situation, we “must construe the pleadings in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction, and if necessary, review the record for evidence supporting jurisdiction.” Id. at 96. If the pleadings and record neither demonstrate jurisdiction nor conclusively negate it, the defendant bears the burden of showing the plaintiff failed to show or would be unable to show jurisdiction. Id. If the defendant meets this burden, then we must dismiss the plaintiff’s case; otherwise, we remand [*10]  the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. Id.”  Tex. DOT v. Markham, No. 04-18-00812-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7376, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019)

You have to obtain a ruling:

Discovery: “ In order to preserve error, a party must make a timely request for relief and obtain a ruling from the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Addison waited to request limited discovery until the very day of the hearing at which it was supposed to present its prima facie case. Although Addison raised its conditional request for discovery during the hearing, Addison did not obtain a ruling on the requested discovery either at the hearing or in the trial court’s written order. Addison, therefore, failed to preserve its cross-point for our review.”  ETC Tex. Pipeline, Ltd. v. Addison Expl. & Dev., LLC, No. 11-18-00152-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7524, at *32 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 22, 2019)

Discovery: “We conclude Criswell failed to preserve his complaint about whether the Allisons failed to produce documents to comply with his request to produce. While Criswell obtained a ruling on his request that the Allisons organize and label their production, he never got a ruling on his motion to compel them to produce more documents. Because Criswell failed to preserve the alleged error, we overrule his second issue.”  Criswell v. Allison, No. 09-18-00003-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7540, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 22, 2019)

Discovery: “ Buholtz does not show, and nothing in the record indicates, he requested a hearing on either his motion to compel or the other motions. Thus, to the extent Buholtz complains the trial court erred in not ruling on the motions, he has failed to preserve the complaint for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.”  Buholtz v. Gibbs, No. 05-18-00957-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7469, at *14 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 21, 2019)

You have to comply with the pertinent rules:

Default Judgment (New Trial): “Here, [*5]  Maldonado did not file a motion for a new trial, and her attack on the judgment relies on extrinsic evidence. Accordingly, Maldonado failed to preserve this issue for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(b).”  Maldonado v. Medrano, No. 13-18-00525-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7453, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 22, 2019)

There were also a number of cases in which courts held that parties failed to preserve error because they failed to raise their complaint in the trial court.

I hope this helps.  Y’all have a good weekend, and a good week.

Yours, Steve Hayes

shayes@stevehayeslaw.com; www.stevehayeslaw.com; 817/371-8759

Error Preservation in Texas Civil Cases, August 17, 2019

August 17, 2019

Hello, Buckaroos:

Here are some of the error preservation decisions from last week.

Table of Contents

Your complaint must be timely–which, for a complaint about a visiting judge, means it cannot be made before his/her assignment, and must be made within seven days thereafter

Judge (visiting)
Pleading

You have to comply with the pertinent rules

Evidence

You have to get a ruling on your complaint–and the granting of a summary judgment motion does not necessarily amount to such a ruling on a motion for leave to designate an expert

Expert Designation
Evidence

The Blurbs

Your complaint must be timely–which, for a complaint about a visiting judge, means it cannot be made before his/her assignment, and within seven days thereafter:

Judge (visiting): “McCann claims that he preemptively objected to the judge in his original petition. His petition asserted his objection “to the referral of this case to any judge not elected to the district filed in.” This objection, however, was improper. See In re Carnera, 05-16-00055-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 806, 2016 WL 323654, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 27, 2016, no pet.).  “A party does not possess the right to object to the assignment of a visiting [*7] judge before the assignment takes place.” Id. (citing Discovery Operating, Inc. v. Baskin, 855 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no writ)). “Section 74.053 clearly contemplates that assigned judge objections will be filed after the assignment of a judge to whom a party objects, not that parties can file pro forma blanket objections to assigned judges at the time they file their initial pleadings.” Id. Here, McCann filed his original petition and objection on April 30, 2018, but Judge Johnson was not appointed until May 3, 2018. Accordingly, the objection in his original petition did not preserve this issue. McCann later wrote a formal “Objection to Assigned Judge.” The certificate of service on this objection reflects the date of May 11, 2018, . . . . However, assuming but not deciding that McCann placed his objection in the prison mail system on May 11, 2018, as he claims, that date is eight days after the appointment of Judge Johnson on May 3, 2018. Because the deadline for filing objection to judges is seven days after the notice of appointment or the case’s [*9] first hearing, whichever is sooner, McCann missed the deadline. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.053. We conclude that McCann did not submit a timely objection to the assignment of Judge Johnson. See id. Judge Johnson thus had jurisdiction to hear the case. See id. We overrule McCann’s second issue.” McCann v. De Hoyos, No. 13-18-00528-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7143, at *6-9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 15, 2019)

Pleading: “In its second issue, Zimmerman complains that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing Pastran to amend her pleadings to allege gross negligence against Zimmerman. The record, however, does [*17] not support Zimmerman’s characterization of what occurred. . . . Zimmerman agreed that Pastran was entitled to get information on the disputed issues if she pleaded gross negligence on the part of the employer. Zimmerman further agreed that Pastran could amend her pleadings [*18] and later, depending on what discovery revealed, amend again to drop the gross negligence claim. The court then addressed counsel for Pastran: “Okay. So why don’t you do that, Mr. Langford?” The record does not reflect that Pastran made any response, nor does it reflect that Zimmerman made any objection to the court’s question. Indeed, there was no further discussion of the subject and the hearing ended. Approximately ten days later, Pastran amended her petition to allege gross negligence against Zimmerman. To preserve error for appellate review, a party must make a timely request, objection, or motion stating the grounds with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1. The record does not contain any such timely request, objection, or motion challenging the propriety of the trial court’s question to Pastran. Rather, the complaint was raised for the first time in Zimmerman’s motion for new trial, almost two years later. The issue is not preserved for review.”  Zimmerman Truck Lines v. Pastran, No. 08-17-00131-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7252, at *16-19 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 16, 2019)

You have to comply with the pertinent rules:

Evidence: “”Further, in order to preserve error regarding any other alleged drug use by Erica, Brittney and Andre were each required to inform the trial court of the substance of the excluded evidence by an offer of proof, which neither of them did. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). Because of this, we are unable to determine what additional evidence would have been offered and cannot determine whether the evidence would have been admissible or not. Brittney and Andre’s complaints were not properly preserved.” In the Interest of A.L.F., No. 10-19-00187-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7132, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 14, 2019)

You have to get a ruling on your complaint–and the granting of a summary judgment motion does not necessarily amount to such a ruling on a motion for leave to designate an expert:

Expert Designation: “We first address Hendryx’s sub-issue contending that the trial court erred in failing to rule on his motion for leave to designate Barnes as an expert witness. . . . In Seim, the trial court’s granting of the defendant’s [*9] summary judgment motion did not serve as an implicit ruling on the defendant’s objections to summary judgment evidence because “even without the objections, the trial court could have granted summary judgment against the [plaintiffs] if it found that their evidence did not generate a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 166. Similarly, the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of appellees in this case did not necessarily imply that the trial court denied Hendryx’s motion for leave. Instead, even if the trial court believed the motion for leave was meritorious, it still could have granted summary judgment if it found Hendryx’s evidence did not generate a genuine issue of material fact. See id.; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Therefore, to the extent this sub-issue asserts that the trial court implicitly denied Hendryx’s motion for leave, we disagree. Instead, we conclude that Hendryx has forfeited any merits-based review of his motion for leave because he never obtained a ruling thereon, and he never objected to the trial court’s failure to rule. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 165-66. This sub-issue is overruled.” Hendryx v. Tucker, No. 13-18-00445-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7146, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 15, 2019)

Evidence: “Hamilton asserts that the letter from the attorney for BioUrja Trading, LLC and Hamilton Metals, LLC amounts to inadmissible hearsay. Hamilton waived the hearsay objection by failing to get a ruling from the trial court. . . . Hamilton asserts that the documents filed as part of Millman’s affidavit amount to inadmissible hearsay and that there was no authentication of these documents. Hamilton waived the hearsay objection by failing to secure a ruling on it from the trial court. . . .Hamilton asserts that the answer PNC Bank filed in the garnishment proceeding constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Hamilton failed to get a ruling on this objection and thus waived it.” Hamilton Metals, Inc. v. Glob. Metal Servs., No. 14-17-00670-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7050, at *19-21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 2019)

All for now.  I hope this helps.

Yours, Steve Hayes.

shayes@stevehayeslaw.com; www.stevehayeslaw.com; 817/371-8759

Error Preservation in Texas Civil Cases, August 10, 2019

August 10, 2019

Dear All:

Here are some of the error preservation decisions from the last few days.

Table of Contents

This case involved an extensive discussion about when including an instruction in a charge caused such egregious harm that it amounted to fundamental error that a complaint about it could first be raised on appeal

Just putting a footnote in a pleading about reserving a right to complain about something does not preserve that complaint

Capacity

You have to get a ruling on your complaint

Discovery
Experts
Experts

The Blurbs

This case involved an extensive discussion of when including an instruction in a charge caused such egregious harm that it amounted to fundamental error that a complaint about it could first be raised on appeal:

Jury Charge (Juvenile): “The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure generally govern the jury charge in juvenile proceedings. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(b); see In re L.D.C., 400 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Tex. 2013). But a juvenile proceeding is quasi-criminal; thus, criminal law precedent may be instructive in juvenile cases. See In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765-67 (Tex. 1999). In criminal cases, jury-charge error is reviewed using a two-step process. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). First, the court determines whether error exists in the charge. Id. If there is error, we determine if the appellant has been harmed: “The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. If an appellant has preserved the error by objection, we must reverse if we find “some harm” to his rights. See id. (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)). But where there is no objection, we will not reverse for jury-charge error unless the record shows “egregious harm” to the appellant. Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“The failure to preserve jury-charge error is not a bar to appellate review, but rather it establishes the degree of harm necessary for reversal.”).

M.S. did not object to the legal-duty law of parties instruction in the jury charge. When the charge error is not preserved “and the accused must claim that [*6] the error was ‘fundamental,’ [she] will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that [she] ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’—in short ‘egregious harm.'” . . . Although there is evidence in the record that supports a conviction under the aiding section of the law of parties, it is equally likely the jury may have convicted M.S. under the legal-duty theory and exposed appellant to conviction under an invalid theory. The charge erroneously allowed the jury to convict M.S. of capital murder and aggravated robbery under an improper legal-duty theory. We hold that this charge error was egregiously harmful because it affected the very basis of the case and deprived M.S. of a valuable right to be tried and convicted under a correct theory.” In re M.S., No. 02-18-00099-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6980, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 8, 2019)

Just putting a footnote in a pleading about reserving a right to complain about something does not preserve that complaint:

Capacity: “Superior initially argues that Badawo lacks standing [*4] to sue as D.B.’s next friend because she has legally adopted him. See In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565, 572 & n.9 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (holding minors cannot sue by next friend if a parent has legal authority to represent them in court). Superior characterizes this as a challenge to Badawo’s standing, but it actually concerns her capacity. . . . And unlike standing, “a challenge to capacity may be waived.” In re Bridgestone, 459 S.W.3d at 573. Preservation of error requires a party to make a “timely request, objection, or motion” and either obtain a ruling or object to the trial court’s [*5] refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Superior included a footnote in its answer stating that it “reserves its right to contest Linda Badawo’s standing to seek legal relief on behalf of this minor.” Dr. Glomb included substantively the same statement in his answer, but neither actually argued to the district court that she lacked capacity or requested a ruling on that issue. We therefore conclude Superior has not preserved this issue for review.” Superior HealthPlan, Inc. v. Badawo, No. 03-18-00691-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6835, at *3-5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 8, 2019)

You have to get a ruling on your complaint:

Discovery: “We also have not addressed the argument raised in appellees’ brief that we can affirm the trial court’s ruling because appellants failed to address a potential ground on which the trial court could have denied their motions to dismiss. In response to the motions, appellees argued a TCPA dismissal in this case would violate the open courts and due course guarantees of the Texas Constitution because appellants violated a rule 11 agreement by producing heavily redacted documents without asserting claims of privilege and, with respect to AVAD, failing to search for backups of deleted emails. The clerk’s record, however, does not contain a motion to compel filed by appellees. The docket sheet shows a motion to compel was filed on August 3, 2018, but also indicates a hearing on the motion was taken off the docket for lack of a proper three-day notice. Because appellees did not obtain a ruling on a motion to compel in the trial court, it waived its argument that the discovery violations were an independent ground on which the trial court could have denied appellants’ motions to dismiss. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)” Pearl Energy Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Gravitas Res. Corp., No. 05-18-01012-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6833, at *19 n.6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 7, 2019)

Experts: “The Davises objected to Dr. Almaguer’s affidavit in the trial court because Dr. Almaguer “is not qualified to opine on causation, his methodology is not reliable, and his opinions are conclusory and unsupported.” The Davises make the same arguments on appeal; however, the record does not contain a ruling on their objection. A “trial court’s ruling on an objection to summary judgment evidence is not implicit in its ruling on the motion for summary judgment; a ruling on the objection is simply not ‘capable of being understood’ from the ruling on the motion for summary judgment.” Seim v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161, 165-66 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Well Sols. Inc. v. Stafford, 32 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.)). Here, the Davises never obtained a ruling on their objection to Dr. Almaguer’s affidavit, and they never objected to the trial court’s failure to rule. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 165-66.” Alvarez v. Salazar-Davis, No. 13-18-00366-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6843, at *16 n.6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 8, 2019)

Experts: “Counsel for D.L.E.B. never objected to the admissibility of Jefferies’s testimony at the hearing on the motion for a finding of aggravated circumstances or at trial. Counsel also failed to file a motion to exclude Jefferies’s testimony on any ground, including that it was speculative and unreliable, and did not request a Daubert/Robinson-type hearing. The trial court was never asked to make a ruling on whether Jefferies’s expert testimony was admissible under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 702. D.L.E.B.’s request for a Rule 705(b) hearing [to allow counsel to cross-examine the expert about the underlying facts and data on which the expert’s opinion is based] does not preserve a complaint about the admissibility of Jefferies’s testimony. . . . Although counsel for D.L.E.B. requested an opportunity to examine Jefferies’s “qualifications,” he did not object to the admission of Jefferies’s testimony then or at trial. In fact, counsel expressly stated: “And I’m not challenging him at this point.” We conclude that D.L.E.B. failed to preserve a complaint that Jefferies’s expert testimony [*15] was inadmissible.” D. L. E. B. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-19-00186-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6834, at *13-15 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 8, 2019)

Several cases also dealt with situations in which parties failed to preserve error by failing to raise their complaint at all in the trial court.

All for now.  I hope this helps.

Yours, Steve Hayes

shayes@stevehayeslaw.com; www.stevehayeslaw.com; 817/371-8759

Error Preservation in Texas Civil Cases, Aug. 7, 2019

August 7, 2019

Dear All:

Here are some of the error preservation decisions from last week.

Table of Contents

One case held that you can preserve a complaint about receiving insufficient notice of a hearing by raising it in a motion to reinstate

For a bench trial, you can first raise sufficiency complaints on appeal

You have to get a ruling from the trial court

Evidence

You have to make a record

Discovery

The complaint you raise on appeal must be the complaint you raised at trial

Evidence

The Blurbs

One case held that you can preserve a complaint about receiving insufficient notice of a hearing by raising it in a motion to reinstate:

Notice: “Walsh, citing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a)(1), asserts White failed to object on the record that she received insufficient notice and, consequently, waived her issue. We disagree. Rule 33.1(a)(1) requires, as a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, that the record must show the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Here, White made a complaint regarding insufficient notice through her motion for reinstatement, which specified as a ground for reinstatement that White received insufficient notice.” White v. Walsh, No. 04-18-00609-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6529, at *4 n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 31, 2019)

For a bench trial, you can first raise sufficiency complaints on appeal:

Legal and Factual Sufficiency: “Father primarily argues that Mother did not sufficiently prove the reasonableness of her attorney’s fees. Father may raise this insufficiency-of-the-evidence argument for the first time on appeal. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(a), (b); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d);” In the Interest of K.A.M.S., No. 14-18-00015-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6717, at *25-26 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 6, 2019)

Legal and Factual Sufficiency: “We begin by addressing the Hancheys’ argument that Cantu did not preserve her legal sufficiency complaint because she failed to request additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33 provides that “[i]n a civil nonjury case, a complaint regarding the legal or factual insufficiency of the evidence . . . may be made for the first time on appeal in the complaining party’s brief.” Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d). Cantu’s legal sufficiency challenge is, therefore, properly preserved. See id.” Cantu v. Hanchey, No. 04-18-00697-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6539, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 31, 2019)

Legal and Factual Sufficiency: “In addition, Father argues Mother did not “offer any evidence to support her claim for an attorney fee award for her Counter-Petition to Modify the Parent Child relationship” and “offered no evidence to prove . . . that the fees sought were reasonable and necessary for the prosecution [*13] of the suit.” HN2 Father may raise this insufficiency-of-the-evidence argument for the first time on appeal. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(a), (b); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d)” In the Interest of D.Z., No. 14-17-00938-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6466, at *12-13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2019)

You have to get a ruling from the trial court:

Evidence: “During re-direct examination of Attalla, Attalla’s counsel attempted to rebut Hulsey’s assertion that he lacked sufficient coverage:

[Attalla’s counsel]: Do you understand that he has unlimited coverage now because they had the opportunity to settle—

[Hulsey’s counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. They’re—this is—

[Trial Court]: Okay. Never mind. We’ll leave it there. Any other questions about the . . . .

[Attalla’s counsel]: Oh, yes—

[Trial Court]: —unrelated to insurance?

[Attalla’s counsel]: The amount of insurance is not true. It’s unlimited.

[Trial Court]: I understand your argument.

[Attalla’s counsel]: Thank you.

Although Hulsey objected, he did not obtain a ruling from the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (providing that preservation of error requires objection and ruling).” Hulsey v. Attalla, No. 01-18-00180-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6654, at *47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 1, 2019)

You have to make a record:

Discovery: “At the December 2, 2016 hearing, the Fishers offered evidence in support of their Motion for Docket Control Order in which they requested new discovery deadlines. As stated, the appellate record does not include the reporter’s record from that hearing. When the record is incomplete, the court of appeals must presume the missing reporter’s record supports the trial judge’s decision. . . . At the March 24 hearing, appellants stated their position that the case should be dismissed unless the Fishers had evidence to show otherwise. The Fishers proposed to offer their evidence again. The trial judge did not require them to, stating he had sufficient information to make a decision. Appellants did not object to the fact that the court did not have the Fishers put on their evidence again in appellants’ presence or otherwise make such a complaint known to the judge. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).” PS Royal Servs. Grp., LP v. Fisher, No. 05-17-01139-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6744, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 5, 2019)

The complaint you raise on appeal must be the complaint you raised at trial:

Evidence: “Guillermo’s objection to the photos at trial did not challenge them on the basis that they were not originals. He instead objected to them on the basis that they lacked a date-time stamp. Thus, Guillermo did not preserve his best-evidence argument for review. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a);” Puente v. Puente, No. 01-18-00583-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6494, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 30, 2019)

There were several cases in which courts held that the complaining party waived a complaint by failing to raise the complaint in the trial court.

All for now.  I hope this helps.

Yours,

Steve Hayes

shayes@stevehayeslaw.com; www.stevehayeslaw.com; 817/371-8759

Error Preservation in Texas Civil Cases, 8/2/2019

August 2, 2019

Dear All:

I apologize for the long hiatus in publishing this. I got busy with work and traveling to speak, and got way behind. I’m now pretty much bushed from gathering the last several weeks worth of error preservation decisions, so the compilation below is not edited as well as I normally do.

Table of Contents

Cases you may want to read in terms of a party preserving a complaint about failure to receive appropriate notice of a trial setting

Your complaint must be sufficiently specific to make the trial court aware of it–with examples which did and didn’t, from the same case

Evidence
Evidence

You must bring your complaint to the trial court’s attention

Attorneys’ Fees
Continuance
Default Judgment

You have to get a ruling on your complaint

Attorney ad Litem
Motions

Your complaint on appeal must comport with the complaint you made in the trial court

Continuance

You have to comply with the pertinent rules

Affidavits
Evidence
Factual Sufficiency
Findings and Conclusions
Findings and Conclusions
Limitations
Necessary Party

The Blurbs

Cases you may want to read in terms of a party preserving a complaint about failure to receive appropriate notice of a trial setting:

Notice: “In this case, Taplin did appear at the trial. However, he never stated that he was ready to proceed. On the contrary, [*15] he repeatedly, both orally and in writing, asked for a continuance. Based on the record before us, we hold that error was preserved because Taplin, in addition to requesting a continuance, never “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” waived proper notice under Rule 245. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 120. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for continuance.” $2,424.21 in United States Currency v. State, No. 02-18-00303-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6188, at *14-15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 18, 2019)

Notice: “Generally, a complaint for appellate review must be preserved by specific objection or motion in the trial court to allow the trial court an opportunity to correct the error. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. However, a party who complains of inadequate notice of a hearing and does not appear at the hearing may raise the complaint for the first time following the hearing. In re B.T.G., No. 05-17-00521-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4911, 2017 WL 2334243 at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Discussion
Appellants argue they did not receive adequate notice of the hearing. A review of the record reveals appellants are correct. The court reporter filed her contest on June 5, 2019. The same day, she mailed a copy of the contest to appellants [*3] by certified mail along with a notice of hearing, which set the contest for hearing on June 11, 2019. Thus, appellants were provided with at most six days’ notice of the hearing. The ten day notice period is mandatory and appellants did not receive sufficient notice. Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(f)(5) (“declarant must be given ten days’ notice of the hearing”). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in granting the court reporter’s motion challenging appellants’ affidavits of indigence.” Townley v. Lanier, No. 14-19-00447-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5691, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2019)

Your complaint must be sufficiently specific to make the trial court aware of it–with examples which did and didn’t, from the same case:

Evidence: “X.D. argues that the photo array was impermissibly suggestive because (1) it was administered by a school official instead of by law enforcement personnel, and (2) two of the seven photos in the array were of other “possible suspects.” We first address the State’s argument that X.D. forfeited this issue because it does not comport with his counsel’s trial objection. To preserve error for appellate review, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require that the record show that the objection “stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). If the issue on appeal does not comport with the objection made at trial, the error is forfeited. Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)….X.D.’s counsel objected [to the photo array] as follows: ‘I’m going to object, Your Honor. They’re improper photo lineups. They weren’t done correctly. They’re not supposed to have seven people. You’re not supposed to have multiple people in the same lineup. So I’m going to object to anything as far as the photo lineup goes.’ …Nothing in X.D.’s counsel’s trial objection put the court or the State on notice of his complaint that the photo array evidence was administered by a school official instead of law enforcement. We therefore hold that X.D. forfeited this argument for appellate review.” In re X.D., No. 01-18-00590-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6399, at *20-22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 25, 2019)

Evidence: “But X.D. did not forfeit his argument that the inclusion of photos of J.M. and A.G. rendered the photo array impermissibly suggestive. Here, given Officer Provencio’s testimony just before the State offered the photo array evidence, it is clear that “[y]ou’re not supposed to have multiple people in the same lineup” was an objection that the inclusion of J.M. and A.G. in the photo array made it impermissibly suggestive. .” In re X.D., No. 01-18-00590-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6399, at *20-22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 25, 2019)

You must bring your complaint to the trial court’s attention:

Attorneys’ Fees: “In her fifth issue, Purvis contends that the trial court erred when it failed to compel payment of attorney’s fees previously awarded to her pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. We have not located where in the record Purvis alerted the trial court to its failure to rule on her motion to compel payment of the fees awarded in the prior fee order. Nor did Purvis request that the trial court offset, or object to the trial court’s failure to account for, such award in its final judgment. Purvis did not preserve her fifth issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).” Watson v. Purvis, No. 14-18-00132-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5692, at *21 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2019)

Continuance: “As a prerequisite to complaining on appeal about the denial of a motion for continuance, the record must show that the motion was brought to the trial court’s attention and that (1) the trial court denied the motion or (2) the trial court refused to rule on the motion and the complaining party objected to the refusal. Bryant v. Jeter, 341 S.W.3d 447, 450-51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.) (plaintiff filed motion for continuance three days before hearing on motion for summary judgment and filed response on day of hearing; failure to obtain ruling on motion for continuance failed to preserve error); see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Mitchell v. Bank of Am., N.A., 156 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (“[Plaintiffs] failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court on the motion for continuance and therefore, failed to preserve error.”). In this case, the record does not show that Hartsfield’s motion for continuance was brought to the trial court’s attention. Likewise, the record does not show that the trial court either denied the motion or refused to rule on the motion. And to the extent that the trial court refused to rule [*5] on the motion, the record does not show that Hartsfield objected to that refusal. As a result, we conclude that this issue has not been preserved for appellate review.” Hartsfield v. Bank of Am., No. 05-17-01354-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5716, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 9, 2019)

Default Judgment: “In her fourth issue, Roux complains that the trial court should have entered a default judgment in her favor as to her application for attorney’s fees because Ford failed to file an answer in response to her application. We disagree. Roux did not move for entry of judgment on her application for attorney’s fees, nor did she file a mandamus in this Court complaining about the trial court’s failure to enter a default judgment. See In re Mesa Petroleum Partners, LP, 538 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding) (“Consequently, mandamus relief is available if a trial court has failed to enter judgment within a reasonable time.”). HN3 The failure to move for judgment or call the [*9] motion for judgment to the attention of the trial court waives the issue. See Tex-Wash Enters., Inc. v. Robna, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The record fails to show that appellants’ motion for judgment was ever called to the attention of the trial court or acted upon by it. In this state of the record, nothing relating to the motion is presented for review.”). We therefore conclude that Roux waived this complaint by failing to move for default judgment on her application for attorney’s fees. We overrule Roux’s fourth issue.” Estate of Pharris, No. 10-17-00260-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5623, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Waco July 3, 2019)

You have to get a ruling on your complaint:

Attorney ad Litem: “Chico’s third and final issue challenges the trial court’s denial of Chico’s motion for the appointment of an ad litem attorney for Mary. But we need not reach this issue either. Because Chico directs [*11] us to no apparent final adverse ruling or refusal to rule in this record, the complaint is not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2).” Chico Auto Parts & Serv. v. Maxey, No. 02-18-00352-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5609, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2019)

Motions: “To the extent that Florence challenged other interlocutory rulings of the trial court, such as its refusal [*6] to rule on certain motions, those appellate issues are waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (appellant must show that trial court ruled or refused to rule on a motion); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978) (pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys); see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to the authorities and to the record.”).” J.M.G., No. 01-17-00690-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5918, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 11, 2019)

Your complaint on appeal must comport with the complaint you made in the trial court:

Continuance: “In her first issue, Mendez argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for continuance based on Rule 601 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. In her motion for continuance, Mendez did not cite to Rule 601 or claim she was incompetent to testify. Instead, Mendez “move[d] [*6] that the trial on the merits be continued in order to allow her a full recovery.” Mendez argued that “having a trial to finalize the pending divorce is and will be detrimental to her, her case[,] and not in the best interest of the child.” As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the appellant complained to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion stating the grounds for the ruling sought with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the grounds were apparent from the context. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Additionally, an appellant’s complaint on appeal must comport with the complaint she made in the trial court. Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Clack, No. 04-17-00348-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3068, 2018 WL 2024664, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 2, 2018, pet. denied). Because the complaint Mendez presents on appeal differs from the complaint she made in her motion for continuance, she has not preserved this issue for review on appeal. See id.; Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Mendez further argues in this section of her brief that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for new trial. However, Mendez’s motion for new trial did not present a complaint about Rule 601(a)(1) or her competence to testify. Therefore, Mendez’s complaint about [*7] the denial of the motion for new trial is not preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1).” Mendez v. Delgado, No. 04-18-00454-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6053, at *5-7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 17, 2019)

You have to comply with the pertinent rules:

Affidavits: “Dees argues that the trial court should have given her the opportunity to amend her summary judgment affidavits in response to form objections. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f). However,”[w]hen a summary judgment movant objects to summary judgment evidence proffered by the nonmovant, the burden lies upon the nonmovant to request relief under rule 166a(f), including a continuance or the opportunity to cure any formal defects in the nonmovant’s summary judgment evidence.” Coleman v. Woolf, 129 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). “Generally, a motion for continuance is the proper procedure to obtain this ‘opportunity.'” Tri-Steel Structures, Inc. v. Baptist Found. of Tex., 166 S.W.3d 443, 448 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied) (citing Webster v. Allstate Ins. Co., 833 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ)). Here, after the Homeowners filed their objections, Dees had the opportunity to seek leave to amend or supplement her affidavits or, if necessary, to seek a continuance of the hearing. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f); Eckmann v. Des Rosiers, 940 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ). Dees failed to take either action before the trial court’s judgment, instead only moving for clarification after the final judgment and more than three months after the Homeowners’ objections, thereby [*9] waiving this issue for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.” Dees v. Thomas, No. 03-18-00372-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5560, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Austin July 3, 2019)

Affirmative Defense (Limitations): “However, the record reflects that CitiFinancial never submitted issues to the jury or obtained a ruling in the trial court regarding when Hollenberg’s claims against CitiFinancial accrued. “Limitations is an affirmative defense and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Naficy v. Baker, 642 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).” Cfna Receivables Tx v. Hollenberg, No. 09-18-00260-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5910, at *14 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 11, 2019)

Evidence: “There is no reporter’s record of the evidence presented in this case, and Sparkman did not file a formal bill of exception. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(c). Without a record of the evidence, we know little about the underlying basis for the court’s findings, and we are unable to determine whether the [*4] court abused its discretion in modifying the order for medical and child support. See Rogers, 2016 WL 3162299, at *5; D.D.A., 2006 WL 1547869, at *3. Because we must presume that the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient to support the order, we hold that Sparkman did not meet his burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion.” Sparkman v. Ag of Tex., No. 01-18-00503-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5917, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 11, 2019)

Factual Sufficiency: “In his second issue, De Leon challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and he argues that the findings on the three charge questions are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  A “great weight” challenge to a jury finding presents an issue of factual sufficiency. Kratz v. Exxon Corp., 890 S.W.2d 899, 904 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ). To preserve a complaint of factual insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding, a complaint that a finding is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, or that a finding of damages was inadequate, a party must raise the issue in a timely filed motion for new trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2)-(4) (stating appellant cannot challenge factual sufficiency [*8] of evidence without first raising point in motion for new trial); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1991); Cannon v. Castillo, No. 11-12-00256-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8656, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). The record in this case does not indicate that De Leon presented his factual sufficiency challenge in a motion for new trial. Although De Leon filed a motion for new trial, the sole complaint raised in that motion was that Hernandez failed to plead the negligence of De Leon as an affirmative defense. Because De Leon did not raise a factual sufficiency complaint in his motion for new trial, he has failed to preserve the issue for our review.” De Leon v. Hernandez, No. 07-18-00138-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5453, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 27, 2019)

Findings and Conclusions: “By its first issue, AJS contends that the trial court erred by failing to list it as a party in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, HN1 a trial court need not make findings of fact on undisputed matters, and here, AJS did not dispute that it was involved in this cause. See Limbaugh v. Limbaugh, 71 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.). Moreover, AJS did not request additional findings [*3] of fact; thus, any complaint to those findings is waived.” Air Jireh Serv. Corp. v. Weaver & Jacobs Constructors, Inc., No. 13-15-00180-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5797, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 11, 2019)

Findings and Conclusions: “In its findings, the trial court recited that during their marriage, Ngwu and Toni acquired “[c]ash in financial accounts of minimal value, minimally valued retirement accounts, 2011 Chevrolet Suburban, 2013 Chevrolet Malibu, 2017 Dodge Caravan, 2017 Nissan Sentra, and minimally valued household items and personal belongings.” The trial court found Ngwu and Toni’s community estate was encumbered by the following: “[a]uto loan payable to SSFCU on Dodge Caravan, lien owed to LastPointe Automotive on 2011 Chevrolet Suburban, auto loan payable to Santander Consumer on 2017 Nissan [*7] Sentra, and other minimal debts of the parties.” The trial court specifically recited that it “took into consideration the following factors in making a determination of a just and right division: needs of the parties, needs of the children of the parties, periods of possession of the parties, parties’ contributions in the marriage.” Ngwu did not request additional or amended findings or conclusions. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hargrove, No. 04-18-00355-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1703, 2019 WL 1049293, at * 2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 6, 2019, pet. filed.) (mem. op.); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 298. For that reason, his complaint that section 6.711 of the Texas Family Code required the trial court to assign a monetary value to these items is not properly preserved. See Hargrove, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1703, 2019 WL 1049293, at *2 (holding party’s complaint about adequacy of findings was waived when party never requested additional or amended findings); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).” Ngwu v. Toni, No. 04-18-00762-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6281, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 24, 2019)

Limitations: “To the extent that Ace asserts on appeal that Rush “wholly failed to plead or prove that he timely filed suit” and “limitations should . . . result in the dismissal of his case,” we note that statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be proven at trial or through a motion for summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 94; In re D.K.M., 242 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.); In re K.B.S., 172 S.W.3d 152, 153 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); see also Chicas, 522 S.W.3d at 75 n.4 (“As an affirmative defense, th[e] limitations issue is properly left for resolution by way of a motion for summary judgment . . . .”). An affirmative defense that is not pleaded or proved and on which findings are not obtained is waived. See Hamm v. Millennium Income Fund, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 256, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); In re C.M., 996 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“A defendant relying on an affirmative defense [*16] must plead, prove, and secure findings to sustain the defense.”); see also Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862, 869 n.8 (Tex. 2011). Here, Ace only asserted its statute-of-limitations affirmative defense in its plea to the jurisdiction. See In re D.K.M., 242 S.W.3d at 865 (“[A]n affirmative defense such as the running of limitations should be raised through a motion for summary judgment, not through . . . a plea to the jurisdiction.”). Because Ace failed to plead, prove, and obtain findings on his statute-of-limitations affirmative defense, we hold that it has waived any complaint related to Rush’s purported failure to comply with the statute of limitations found in Texas Labor Code section 410.252(a).” Rush v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., No. 01-18-00402-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5709, at *15-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2019)

Necessary Party: “Linda next contends that the trial court erred in granting Nationstar summary judgment because Nationstar failed to pursue claims against Ziad Allan, whom Linda characterizes as a necessary party. We conclude that this complaint has been waived. A party must object to the failure to join a necessary party by a pleading verified by affidavit. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(4) (“unless the truth of such matters appear of record,” a pleading setting up a “defect of parties” “shall be verified by affidavit”); CHCA E. Hous., L.P. v. Henderson, 99 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“Generally, a ‘defect of parties’ refers to joinder problems [*9] involving necessary or indispensable parties.” (citing Allison v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 703 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam))). Linda raised this complaint in her motion for new trial after the trial court granted summary judgment. Thus, the complaint is both untimely and unverified, and it accordingly is waived.” Allan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 14-18-00246-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5686, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2019)

There were a dozen or so cases in which parties failed to preserve their complaints because they did not raise the same in the trial court.

I hope this helps.  Y’all have a great weekend.

Yours, Steve Hayes

shayes@stevehayeslaw.com; 817/371-8759; www.stevehayeslaw.com