Error Preservation Update, November 4, 2016

November 4, 2016

Dear All:

The Supreme Court has recently held that a party can preserve a complaint about the overbreadth and irrelevance of documents sought by the other side by first asserting the same in a response to a motion to compel–assuming, of course, that the first time the pertinent documents were sought was in that motion to compel, and not in a prior request for production. In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 15-0452, 60 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 54, 2016 Tex. LEXIS 963, at *8-9, n. 1 (Oct. 28, 2016). But the point here is that the first time you have an objection about any discovery matter, assert the objection.

When a complaint you would like to make might have an error preservation problem, you might consider framing the complaint in a manner which you can raise for the first time on appeal–for example, as a sufficiency of the evidence complaint coming out of a non-jury hearing, or perhaps attacking a part of the charge (and the jury’s answer) as being immaterial (assuming you asserted that argument in a post-trial motion), because it asks the jury to answer a question of law:

• Jury Charge: “Next, Park contends that the jury’s answer to question three of the charge should be disregarded as immaterial and unsupported by the evidence. We overrule the contentions. Our analysis begins with the allegation that the question was immaterial. According to Park, it was immaterial because it submitted a question of law and was fundamentally flawed. We disagree and agree in part. Per question two, the jury was asked: “Did Defendant, [*10] Park . . . fail to comply with the Lease Agreement?” The trial court followed its question with instructions. Aspects of those instructions told the jury that 1) “[i]t is your duty to interpret the following language of the agreement to determine if one of the parties failed to comply with the terms of the agreement: [left blank]”; 2) “[y]ou must decide its meaning by determining the intent of the parties at the time of the agreement;” and 3) “[c]onsider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement, the interpretation placed on the agreement by the parties, and the conduct of the parties.” No one disputed the interpretation of the lease, though. Nor did the trial court include within the aforementioned passages any reference to the particular language in the lease purportedly necessitating interpretation. Furthermore, neither trial attorney informed the trial court of either circumstance or otherwise objected to that part of the charge before the trial court read the instrument to the jury. In remaining silent, we assume that Benchmark is correct in contending that Park waived any complaint about the inclusion of the verbiage in the overall instructions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 274 (stating that [*11] a party objecting to a charge must point out the objectionable matter). Yet, Park still claims that the question remains subject to attack as immaterial, despite the absence of an objection to the jury charge. It is correct. A request to disregard a jury answer as immaterial need not be raised as an objection to the charge. . . . Indeed, logic suggests that the jury must first answer a question before one can ask that the answer be disregarded. Furthermore, the complaint urged here was incorporated into a post-judgment motion of Park. So, it is a complaint that we can address.” Park Plaza Solo, LLC v. Benchmark-Hereford, Inc., No. 07-16-00004-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11487, at *9 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 24, 2016)
• Parent Child Relationship: “Father did not raise his complaints about the service plan’s alleged non-compliance with Family Code Sections 263.102 and 263.103 in the trial court. In its brief, the Department asserts that Father has waived his right to complain about these deficiencies on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (providing, to preserve complaints [*24] for appeal, party must make a timely, specific objection in trial court and obtain a ruling on objection). We note that one court has held, to preserve a procedural-due-process complaint on appeal, arising from a claim—analogous to the one here—that a parent did not sign or understand the service plan, the complaint must first have been raised in the trial court. . . . . In this case, Father has not raised a due-process complaint. Instead, Father frames his appellate issue as a legal-and-factual-sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to unite him with N.K.T., as required under Subsection (N). In contrast to due-process complaints, sufficiency-of-the-evidence complaints may be made for the first time on appeal when arising from a bench trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d). As mentioned, this case was tried to the bench. Because his appellate complaint is brought as a legal-and-factual-sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we will analyze it under those standards.” In the Interest of N.K.T., No. 01-16-00439-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11638, at *23-24 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 27, 2016)
• Sanctions: “However, Sue did not waive her [no evidence] argument that James did not sufficiently prove his entitlement to an award of attorney fees as sanctions. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d); . . . Accordingly, we must examine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s imposition of sanctions.” Mobley v. Mobley, No. 06-15-00058-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11559, at *12-13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 26, 2016)

When you raise a complaint timely, you preserve the same:

• Attorney’s fees: “The record reflects appellant objected to the admission of evidence of attorney’s fees regarding the bill of review on the grounds they had not been pled and the objection was overruled. Accordingly, this issue was preserved for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).” In re K.M.M., Nos. 14-15-00204-CV, 14-15-00540-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11268, at *7 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2016)

You must get a ruling on your complaint, and that ruling can be implicit. However, as the second of these cases show, I would not recommend assuming that an implicit ruling has been made–get it in writing:

• Affidavit: “We note Lindley’s objections to the affidavit of Performance’s credit manager were directed at statements relating to this theory of liability. However, Lindley did not obtain a ruling on his objections, and this court has rejected Lindley’s argument that a trial court implicitly overrules objections in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . . Therefore, Lindley’s complaint that the trial court erred in overruling his objections has not been preserved for our consideration. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.” Lindley v. Performance Food Grp. of Tex., L.P., No. 04-16-00219-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11542, at *6 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 26, 2016)
• Continuance: “Although the record does not reflect that the trial court expressly denied the second continuance motion, we will assume for the purposes of this appeal that the trial court implicitly denied the motion by holding the hearing as scheduled and granting Wells Fargo judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A);” Towncreek Indus., LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 02-15-00393-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11656, at *11 n.5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2016)
• Discovery: “The record reflects that appellant filed a handwritten motion to compel, which was entirely comprised of the following: “Motion to Compel. Requesting motion to compel wife discovery request. Defendant work for independent contractor or self employed.” Nevertheless, the record does not reflect that the trial court ruled on appellant’s motion to compel. Without a ruling from the trial court on the motion to compel, we cannot say that appellant has preserved her complaint as to the motion to compel. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1);” In re Rivers, No. 10-16-00031-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11851, at *12 (Tex. App.—Waco Nov. 2, 2016)

The complaints you pursue on appeal must be–or comport with or be “in sync” with–the complaints you raised at trial:

• Jury Charge: “To the extent that Bruce’s appellate argument may be understood as a complaint that the burden of proof should be on Cauthen because a partner’s duties as codified in chapter 152 of the Business Organizations Code are not the equivalent of common-law fiduciary duties, we conclude that Bruce has failed to preserve such a complaint for appellate review because Bruce made a distinctly different objection in the trial court. Indeed, at the charge conference, Bruce’s attorney appeared to concede that Bruce owed Cauthen a fiduciary duty and that Cauthen had the initial burden of proof, but that Bruce had presented evidence that shifted the burden back to Cauthen: [Bruce’s attorney:] The first objection, Your Honor, is an objection that [*35] Question No. 4 is shifting the burden of proof to Mr. Bruce. While fiduciaries can have the burden of proof in breach of fiduciary duty cases, that burden is a – – a burden shifting is rebuttable and there are times where that can shift back to the fiduciary. In this case we believe the proper formulation of this question is the burden of proof should be on Ms. Cauthen as the fiduciary. We have shown why we did what we did and there is no question that there was [sic] fraud in the sense that, you know, we didn’t lie about the numbers or anything. We have a disagreement over what should have been done. That should rebut the question and shift the burden back to Ms. Cauthen. The test for determining whether a party has preserved error in the jury charge is whether the party timely and plainly made the trial court aware of the complaint and obtained a ruling. . . . . see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 274 (requiring a party objecting to a charge to point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds of the objection); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) (complaint must be made “with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context”). Further, to preserve error for [*36] appeal, a party’s argument on appeal must correspond with its argument in the trial court. . . . Because Bruce’s objection at trial does not comport with any fair reading of his appellate argument, we overrule Bruce’s complaint of charge error without reaching his arguments regarding the nature and extent of the duty of loyalty in the partnership context.” Bruce v. Cauthen, No. 14-15-00693-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11508, at *34-36 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2016)
• Parent Child Relationship: “C.C. argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence State’s Exhibit 39, the CAC’s videotaped forensic interview of G.P., because the court did not “hold[] [a] mandatory hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether or not [G.P.’s] statements were reliable,” “the interviewer . . . us[ed] leading questions to elicit certain statements,” and the interview contained a “reference to an earlier sexual abuse [incident] that was not relevant.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 104.002, 104.006 (Vernon 2014). . . . Initially, we note that in support of his argument, C.C. relies on Family Code sections 104.002 and 104.006. However, at trial, C.C. only objected to the admission of the videotaped forensic interview on the basis of section 104.002. Specifically, his trial counsel stated, “I would like to object on th[e] grounds that it does not meet the requirements of 104 as the statements involved . . . were geared toward eliciting statements from the child.” (Emphasis added.) Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 104.002(4) (“[T]he recording [*78] of an oral statement of [a] child recorded prior to [a] proceeding is admissible into evidence if . . . the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement . . . .”), with id. § 104.006 (statement admissible if, inter alia, trial court “finds that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indications of the statement’s reliability and: (1) the child testifies or is available to testify at the proceeding in court or in any other manner provided for by law; or (2) the court determines that the use of the statement in lieu of the child’s testimony is necessary to protect the welfare of the child”); . . . . To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complaining party must make a timely objection, request, or motion with sufficient specificity and obtain a ruling on the objection, request, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). A specific objection enables a trial court to understand the precise complaint and make an informed ruling, and it affords the offering party an opportunity to remedy the defect, if possible. . . . Further, any complaint made on [*79] appeal must comport with the objection raised in the trial court.” In re G.P., No. 01-16-00346-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11510, at *77-79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 25, 2016)
• Summary Judgment: “Next, we must consider whether the trial court erred in denying Galena Park’s motion for summary judgment. We begin here by noting that the grounds Galena Park urges on appeal are not in complete sync with the grounds it raised in the trial court. In its motion, Galena Park asserted that as a matter of law, the papers Ponder submitted did not constitute a valid election petition because (1) it was impossible to tell what amendments had been supported by the [*17] signatories, (2) the proposed amendments improperly covered multiple subjects, and (3) no Spanish-language translation was provided. On appeal, Galena Park raises the first two grounds, but instead of arguing that a Spanish translation was required, it asserts that the proposed amendments were not in proper form and “would leave a voter guessing as to the chief features and the character and purpose of the proposed amendments.” Because Galena Park has abandoned its Spanish-translation argument on appeal, we will not address the merits of that contention. . . . And because Galena Park did not preserve its objection to the form of the proposed amendments, we likewise will not address the merits of that assertion.” City of Galena Park v. Ponder, No. 14-15-00708-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11502, at *14-17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016)

Your complaint must comply with other pertinent rules (and you must get a ruling on it):

• Continuance: “Even though the trial court granted summary judgment in an unusually expedited manner, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion for several reasons. First, Appellants did not file a verified motion for continuance directed to Wells Fargo’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251-52;  . . . . Appellant’s motion for continuance, which resulted in the summary-judgment hearing being held two months later than its original setting, was filed before Wells Fargo filed its no-evidence motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Second, the record does not reflect that H&H and Towncreek brought its continuance arguments to the attention of the trial [*8] court or sought a ruling on them.”H&H Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Equip. Fin., Inc., No. 02-15-00391-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11653, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2016)
• Jury Charge: “First, TDFPS challenges the charge for allowing the jury to assess damages for lost earnings and “employee benefits.” TDFPS argues that because the term “employee benefits” was left undefined, the jury could have awarded Parra benefits that she had already received or to which she was not entitled, such as workers’ compensation benefits. Although TDFPS made a general objection that the term “employee benefits” was vague, uncertain, and unclear because it was undefined in the charge, TDFPS did not tender a proposed definition of “employee benefits” to the trial court. The Texas Rules of [*43] Civil Procedure expressly provide that the failure to submit a definition to the jury cannot be deemed a ground for reversal unless a substantially correct definition has been requested in writing and tendered by the party complaining of the judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 278. Even when the party has objected to the absence of a definition, the party waives error in the trial court’s refusal to define a term by failing to request and tender a proper definition in writing. . . . . Therefore, we conclude that by failing to tender a proposed definition of “employee benefits,” TDFPS waived its right to complain of the lack of a definition on appeal. . . Second, TDFPS contends that the trial court failed to provide a proper instruction to the jury defining the terms “compensatory damages” and “nonpecuniary losses” when it instructed the jury to determine whether Parra should be given an award of “[c]ompensatory damages in the past, which may include emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.” TDFPS argues that the lack of a definition could have resulted in a double recovery, because the jury may have believed that the term “compensatory damages” covered the economic damages already assessed for Parra’s lost earnings and benefits. However, TDFPS has again waived its right to raise this argument by failing to provide a proposed definition of “compensatory damages” at trial, as required by [*45] Rule 278. We also note that the trial court cautioned the jury against making a double recovery on the different elements of damages, when it advised the jury to: “Consider each element separately. Do not include damages for one element in any other element.” TDFPS also notes that the term “compensatory damages” includes the concept of both economic and noneconomic damages, and that noneconomic damages is broadly defined by statute to include “physical pain and suffering, mental or emotional pain or anguish, loss of consortium, disfigurement, physical impairment, loss of companionship and society, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind other than exemplary damages.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.001(8, 12) (West 2015 & Supp. 2016). TDFPS argues that Parra did not present any evidence to support recovery for some of those losses, such as physical pain, disfigurement, physical impairment, or loss of consortium, and notes its concern that the jury may have awarded damages for those losses without sufficient evidence. We do not share this concern. First, TDFPS argued at trial that jury confusion would arise because the term “nonpecuniary losses” was left [*46] undefined. If TDFPS believed it was necessary to provide a limited definition of “nonpecuniary losses” to avoid any potential confusion, it was incumbent upon TDFPS to tender a limited definition. Because TDFPS failed to tender any such definition, it has waived error.” Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Parra, No. 08-14-00148-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11743, at *43-46 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 28, 2016)

You have to raise your complaint in the trial court:

• Affidavit: “We first take up the COA’s assertion that we may not consider Wilkins’s affidavit, as well as Wilkins’s counterargument that we may consider his affidavit given that the COA did not object to its consideration in the trial court. Our review of the record reveals that the COA lodged no objection to Wilkins’s affidavit in the trial court. As such, the COA may not complain of the affidavit for the first time [*11] on appeal.” Burkholder v. Wilkins, No. 13-16-00273-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11345, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 20, 2016)
• Attorney’s Fees: “To preserve certain complaints regarding an award of attorney’s fees, a party must make a timely and sufficiently specific objection in the trial court. . . .Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). A similar argument to the one presented in this case was made to the court in Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 760-61 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied). In that case, Goodson asserted there was no statutory authority allowing a court to award attorney’s fees “in the nature of child support.” Id. The court held that “to make these claims on appeal, Goodson was required to present these complaints to the trial court.” Id. Finding no motion or objection in the record, the court concluded Goodson failed to preserve the complaint [*7] for appeal and overruled the issue. Id. Appellant does not to refer this court to any objection or motion in the record apprising the trial court of the complaint made on appeal and our review of the record reveals that none was made. Because appellant did not raise this issue before the trial court, it has not been preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). We overrule appellant’s first issue.” In re K.M.M., Nos. 14-15-00204-CV, 14-15-00540-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11268, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2016)
• Constitutional: “The statutory amendments about which Clemons complains became effective on June 17, 2015, and Clemons’s trial began on September 28, 2015. The appellate record indicates that Clemons did not raise the issue of the constitutionality of the amended SVP statute before or during trial, and he failed to raise the issue in his motion for new trial. Therefore, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Nevertheless, Clemons argues that, after his own trial had concluded and the court denied his motion for new trial, a different trial court . . . declared Chapter 841 as amended unconstitutionally punitive. . . . Clemons argues that his constitutional claim on appeal should be considered timely because “‘a person may always obtain relief from an indictment or a conviction based on a penal statute that has been previously declared unconstitutional.'” . . . We find Chance and Fournier inapposite because those cases pertained to the constitutionality of a penal statute, and the SVP commitment statute is a civil statute.” In re Clemons, No. 09-15-00488-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11413, at *21-22 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 20, 2016)
• Continuance: “McGalliard also argues that the trial court erred in not continuing the summary-judgment hearing, given that her attorney had been allowed to withdraw just six days before the hearing. Because [*4] this argument, too, was not brought before the trial court, it is unpreserved for our review. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).” McGalliard v. Hill, No. 06-16-00025-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11596, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 27, 2016)
• Due Process: “By her second issue, A.P. argues that the trial court erred, violating her due process rights, by proceeding with trial without her presence “when her refusal to attend trial was due to incarceration, [her] mental status, and the facility’s refusal to transport [her].” . . . her counsel did not request a continuance.” In the Interest of J.P., No. 13-16-00240-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11342, at *12-13 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 20, 2016)
• Evidence: “The reporter’s record reflects that defense counsel did not lodge an objection until the State had asked more than a dozen questions of Clemons regarding the details of the offenses. Defense counsel then objected that “[t]here’s no good-faith basis for this line of questioning. Mr. Clemons has denied the details of the convictions, the details during his deposition, with his evaluation with Dr. Turner and with his evaluation with Dr. Clayton.” The court overruled the objection, and the line of questioning continued for about ten pages. The defense made no further objection and did not request a running objection. Therefore, by his failure to object to the previous and subsequent questioning, Clemons has waived the issue for appeal.” In re Clemons, No. 09-15-00488-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11413, at *33 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 20, 2016)
• Evidence: “A hearsay complaint regarding summary-judgment evidence is one as to form and, thus, is not preserved for appeal unless an objection is made to, and a ruling is obtained from, the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2);. . . . Since McGalliard made no objection to the evidence at or before the hearing on summary judgment, no hearsay point, or any other complaint as to form, is preserved for our review.” McGalliard v. Hill, No. 06-16-00025-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11596, at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 27, 2016)
• Evidence: “We begin by looking at Tchernowitz’s six “points of error,” which we hold are merely vague assertions about: (1) the misnumbering of an exhibit; (2) alleged overpayment of rent; (3) an alleged imposter witness presented by The Gardens; (4) the proper expiration date of the lease; (5) The Gardens’ failure to have a “Letter of Good Standing”; and (6) the “unintelligible” nature of the lease terms. None of these “complaints” allege error by the trial court, nor do they relate to the actual basis for the trial court’s judgment — eviction based on violation of the lease terms by having an unauthorized resident in the apartment unit. And, if Tchernowitz’s “points of error” could be interpreted to allege some error by the trial court, none were preserved by a proper objection. See id. R. 33.1(a).” Tchernowitz v. Gardens at Clearwater, No. 04-15-00716-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11535, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 26, 2016)
• Damages: “Without question all of the go-kart deliveries were late under the terms of the contract. High Rev’s only argument that Freeport was not entitled to recover the late fees agreed to by both parties is the fees constitute an illegal penalty. HN6 Although late charges may amount to unenforceable liquated damages in some cases, the burden of proving the fee is an illegal penalty is on the party seeking to invalidate the provision. . . . In this case, High Rev did not challenge the propriety of the late fee in the trial court, and makes no argument on appeal to show why the fees are an illegal penalty. Accordingly, High Rev has waived this issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.” High Rev Power, L.L.C. v. Freeport Logistics, Inc., No. 05-13-01360-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11772, at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 31, 2016)
• Possessory Conservator: “Father did not object at trial to his appointment as possessory conservator. To preserve error for appeal, a party is required to make a timely request, objection or motion to the trial court and obtain an express or implied ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Accordingly, we conclude Father failed to preserve error with regard to this issue.” In the Interest of A.J.I.L., No. 14-16-00350-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11253, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2016)
• Sanctions: “In this case, the trial court did not detail the specifics justifying its imposition of sanctions. Yet, a trial court’s failure to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion only if the sanctioned party brought the omission to the attention of the trial court. . . . Sue did not object to the trial court’s failure to explain its ruling in either its letter ruling or its final judgment. An appellant waives her right to complain of a trial court’s failure to specify the grounds for its sanctions order if the appellant did not first bring the omission to the trial court’s attention. [*13] Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; . . . Because Sue failed to bring the omission to the trial court’s attention, she has waived any complaint on that basis.” Mobley v. Mobley, No. 06-15-00058-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11559, at *12-13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 26, 2016)
• Sanctions: “A motion for sanctions must identify the specific statute or rule the offending party allegedly violated. . . . James failed to comply with this requirement; however, Sue did not object to the trial court’s award of attorney fees as sanctions based on James’ failure to identify the specific statute Sue allegedly violated. To the extent Sue did not present her argument that James failed to provide the trial court with statutory authority, her claim was not preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Her remaining claims at trial and on appeal appear to be based on James’ failure to prove the necessary elements to enable the trial court to award attorney fees as sanctions. We will therefore address only those claims.” Mobley v. Mobley, No. 06-15-00058-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11559, at *9 n.8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 26, 2016)
• Visitation: “Father did not raise any objections at trial to the Department’s requests for child support or a visitation schedule in accordance with the MSA. Thus, Father failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).” In the Interest of A.J.I.L., No. 14-16-00350-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11253, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2016)
• Withdrawal: “McGalliard argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred by permitting her attorney to withdraw without complying with Rule 10 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and with a pending motion for summary judgment and then proceeding to hear and grant the motion. But McGalliard has not preserved this complaint for our review. For us to review an issue, it must have been preserved in the trial court. . . . Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); . . . . Unless that is done, no error is preserved. Bryant v. Jeter, 341 S.W.3d 447, 449-50 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). Since McGalliard made no objection to the trial court or took any other action regarding this complaint, she has not preserved it for review. We overrule this point of error.” McGalliard v. Hill, No. 06-16-00025-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11596, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 27, 2016)

Yours,

Steve Hayes

www.stevehayeslaw.com